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Abstract
Background
Are we more risk-averse or risk-seeking when we make decisions on behalf of other people
as opposed to ourselves? So far, findings have not been able to provide a clear and consis-
tent answer.
Method
We propose a meta-analysis to assess whether self-other differences vary according to par-
ticular features of the decision. We reviewed 78 effect sizes from 49 studies (7,576
participants).
Results
There was no overall self-other difference, but there were moderating effects of domain and
frame. Decisions in the interpersonal domain were more risk-averse for self than for other.
Decisions in the medical domain were more risk-seeking for self than for other. There were
no overall self-other differences in the financial domain, however there was a moderating
effect of frame: decisions in a gain frame were more risk-averse for self than other whereas
decisions in a loss frame were more risk-seeking for self than other. This effect of frame was
slightly different overall and in the medical domain, where self-other differences occurred in
a loss frame but not in a gain frame.
Conclusion
Future work should continue to investigate how the specific content and context of the deci-
sion impacts self-other differences in order to understand the effects of domain and frame
we report.
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Introduction
Background
The question addressed by the present meta-analytic review is the following: are we more risk-
averse or risk-seeking for others compared to the self and is this context-dependent? The pros-
pect of a risk is integral to the decisions we are faced with every day, meaning that investigating
how people comprehend and react to the prospect of a risk is crucial to understanding the
decisions they make. Although such research has largely focused on decisions that people
make for themselves, there is a growing interest in investigating the decisions that people
make on behalf of others (from individuals to societies)–surrogate decisions [1,2]. Indeed, we
frequently make decisions for other people, such as buying a present for a loved one or prepar-
ing meals for our family. A range of professionals are also required to make risky surrogate
decisions on a daily basis: doctors when selecting treatments for their patients for example. On
a larger scale, financial investors and institutions often make risky decisions for other people
which can have a role in global economic crises. The present meta-analysis provides an over-
view of the research to date, guided by Tunney and Ziegler’s [3] model of surrogate decision-
making which allows us to bring some order to the literature and reframe it into a coherent,
unifying account of self-other differences in risky decision-making.
Defining key terms. In keeping with the literature on self-other differences, we define a
risky choice as having to decide under uncertainty, whereby at least one of the options contains
a risky outcome. Risk can be expressed as a clear probability (e.g. 50% of chance of winning
£100) or as an uncertain outcome (e.g. asking out a prospective partner). We do not conceptual-
ise risk as necessarily denoting harm as other definitions might do [4]. For the purpose of this
review, we establish surrogate decisions as involving on the one hand a decision-maker–the sur-
rogate–and on the other a recipient–the person or people on behalf of which the surrogate is
making a decision. We consider surrogate decisions as cases in which the recipient has no say in
the decision process; it is not a negotiated decision. The recipient has no choice and accepts the
outcome of the decision made by the surrogate. Decision-makers can vary in their relationship
to the recipient, but in all cases, they make a decision for a recipient who is generally passive.
There are cases of surrogate decision-making where the recipient and other parties are involved
in negotiating the outcome, but this is a different type of decision and one we will not address
here. We will also be confining our review to instances where the decision-maker actually makes
a choice on behalf of the recipient, rather than giving advice or predicting their decisions.
Although the first few studies on self-other differences in risky decision making can be
traced back to fifty years ago [5–7], there has been recent increased interest, particularly in the
field of behavioural economics, linked to the involvement of such decisions in the financial cri-
sis [8–10]. In the psychological literature, interest in surrogate decisions has grown against the
backdrop of a long-standing interest in the role that emotions play in our decision-making
[11–13]. In the medical field and particularly end-of-life care, the question has become of
importance since reports that surrogate decision makers struggle to make accurate choices for
their relatives [14]. However, results have often been contradictory, which may reflect the
domain in which surrogate decisions are made and their impact on the decision-maker and
recipient, amongst other factors. This means that there is no straightforward answer regarding
whether we take more risk or less risk when we make decisions on behalf of other people as
opposed to ourselves. The aim of this meta-analysis is to identify potential factors which con-
tribute to the discrepancies in findings. Although a meta-analysis of self-other differences has
been previously conducted [15], it only included studies prior to 2012 and is therefore missing
a significant proportion of the literature. We wish to build on this review by using Tunney and
Ziegler’s [3] model as a framework to guide our analysis.
Self-other differences in risk-taking
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Theories and models of surrogate decision-making
Tunney and Ziegler’s [3] model of surrogate decision-making suggests a number of factors
which may alter or bias the decision process that are of interest here. The identity of the recipi-
ent–who the decision is being made for–is expected to have an impact on the decision process.
In effect, surrogate choices have been found to vary systematically from choices made for the
self as psychological distance between the decision-maker and the recipient or outcome
increases [16–18]. The significance or importance of the decision is also likely to play a role in
that more thought and care would be put into more consequential decisions. Similarly,
whether the decision-maker is held accountable or not is expected to increase the care put into
a decision. Indeed, Pollmann, Potters and Trautmann [19] found a self-other difference in an
investment task–surrogate decisions were more risk-taking–that disappeared with an account-
ability manipulation.
From a psychological perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis suggests that our risk pref-
erences are the product of an emotional reaction to the anticipated risk rather than a purely
cognitive evaluation of the risk [12]. In a surrogate context, where the decision-maker is not
the recipient of the outcome, there is an empathy gap between the decision-maker and the out-
come [20], which might lead the decision-maker to underestimate the extent to which emo-
tions affect others. This gap also creates psychological distance [21] between the decision-
maker and the outcome, which means that they are more likely to engage in abstract rather
than concrete thought. Therefore, one might expect that emotional involvement should be
reduced in surrogate decision-making. In light of this, a straightforward prediction is that peo-
ple’s own risk preferences will be attenuated when making a decision on behalf of someone
else. We expect that surrogate risk preferences will be closer to risk-neutrality, which is consis-
tent with research suggesting that surrogate decisions are more optimal than people’s own
decisions–less susceptible to delay discounting [18], loss aversion [22] and framing effects
[13]. However, the role that emotions play in the decision process is likely to vary according to
features of the decision. For instance, emotional involvement may be stronger if the recipient
is a child or a sibling rather than a stranger, or in a medical situation where the recipient’s life
is at risk, it might be different than in financial situations; which is why examining how context
affects surrogate decisions is important. Although the risk-as-feelings hypothesis supports the
Tunney and Ziegler [3] model’s prediction about the identity of the recipient, it is unlikely to
fully account for the occurrence and direction of self-other differences in all contexts.
Social Values Theory [23] proposes that surrogate decisions are made according to social
values and expected appropriate behaviour. This arises from findings suggesting that people’s
own choices take into account multiple factors whereas giving advice to others involves focus-
ing on the most important factor of a decision [24]. Consequently, self-other differences will
arise when there is a social value placed on taking or avoiding a risk. If taking a risk is socially
valued, people will take more risk when making a decision for someone else than for them-
selves, and vice versa when risk-taking is not socially valued. It makes sense for surrogates to
make choices according to social norms and values, particularly in cases where they are not
familiar enough with the recipient to know what decision they would want to make. Social val-
ues add another layer of detail and complexity to the factors that influence self-other differ-
ences that is not necessarily accounted for by the Tunney and Ziegler [3] model. However, it is
difficult to make predictions regarding the impact of social values on particular surrogate
choices given that their existence and content is difficult to identify.
Taken together, the theories we have presented make numerous conjectures about the fac-
tors that influence surrogate decisions, thereby predicting that self-other differences present
themselves differently under different circumstances. The benefit of conducting the present
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meta-analysis is to test whether these conjectures are supported. Indeed, findings regarding
self-other differences in decisions involving risk have not always been consistent, which rein-
forces the need for a meta-analysis which investigates how different factors affect self-other
differences.
Findings on self-other differences in risky decision making
Self-other differences appear notably different between decision domains. In the interpersonal
domain, decision-makers seem to be less risk averse when making hypothetical decisions for a
friend than for themselves [23,25–27]. In the medical domain, physicians seem to be more risk
averse when making hypothetical decisions for a patient as opposed to themselves, as do parents
when making hypothetical decisions for their children [28–31]. However, in the financial
domain, the literature is rather contradictory. There are findings suggesting that decision-mak-
ers are less risk averse for close and distant recipients [13,19,32–36], while others reporting that
decision-makers are more risk averse for recipients [37,38], as well as findings reporting no self-
other differences [39,40]. The aim of the meta-analysis will be two-fold: firstly, identifying
whether self-other differences vary across domains and why that may be the case, and secondly,
examining whether certain factors can explain the discrepancies in the financial domain.
Moderators of self-other differences
We will first conduct a main analysis and moderator analyses of all effect sizes. We do not
expect there to be an overall main self-other difference given that previous findings show that
self-other differences in the medical and interpersonal domains are in opposite directions
(therefore cancelling each other out when looking at an overall self-other difference) and
results in the financial domain are mixed. Given our prediction that self-other differences in
risk-taking vary across domains, we will conduct individual analyses for each decision domain
to assess whether the context and content of the decision affects surrogate decisions differently
in each domain. In order to do so, we also need to pick out theoretical moderators which we
expect will have an influence on self-other differences given the theories we outlined above.
Finally, to tease apart inconsistencies in findings, we will also include methodological modera-
tors which can give us an indication of whether conflicting results are a consequence of experi-
mental designs.
Theoretical moderators
Domain. Given previous findings, we expect surrogates to take more risk for others than
for themselves in the interpersonal domain, whereas we expect surrogates to take less risk for
others in the medical domain. In the financial domain, we do not anticipate an overall self-
other difference due to framing effects which we detail below. Furthermore, decisions in the
medical and interpersonal domain can be more significant and life-changing than financial
decisions that involve small amounts of money, which the literature overwhelmingly consists
of. Social values and expectations may also be more prevalent in those domains. According to
Tunney and Ziegler’s [3] model, self-other differences are indeed expected to vary across
domains given that the significance of the decision, the accountability held upon the decision-
maker and the intention of the decision-maker may vary. Social Values Theory [23] also pre-
dicts that self-other differences will differ across domains given that risk-taking is valued dif-
ferently in each domain. Finally, we know that individual risk preferences are not constant
across domains [41], nor do people attend to probabilities in the same way [42] or perceive the
ratio between gains and losses to be equivalent [41]. It is therefore likely that self-other differ-
ences also vary across domains.
Self-other differences in risk-taking
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Frame. We expect self-other differences to differ depending on whether decisions are
made in a gain or a loss frame. People tend to be risk averse in a gain frame and risk seeking in
a loss frame [43]. According to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis which expects risk preferences
to be attenuated when making decisions for others, we would expect self-other differences to
be in opposite directions in a gain and a loss frame. We therefore predict that people take
more risk for others in a gain frame and less risk for others in a loss frame, as has been found
in previous studies [13,44,45]. In cases where decisions are framed as a gain but include the
possibility of a loss, we speculate that self-other differences will be dampened compared to the
gain frame. Similarly, for decisions that are framed as a loss but include the possibility of a
gain, we expect that self-other differences will be dampened compared to the loss frame.
Recipient. Following from Tunney and Ziegler’s model [3], the impact of psychological
distance [21] and empathy gaps [20], we expect the identity of the recipient of the surrogate
decision to influence the decision process, thereby having an effect on self-other differences.
Given past research mentioned above concerning the effect of psychological distance on surro-
gate decision-making, we predict self-other differences to be more pronounced when the
recipient is a stranger than when the recipient is a close other (i.e. where a relationship has
developed between the decision-maker and the recipient: friend, relative, long-term
patient. . .). We speculate that self-other differences may disappear when decisions are made
for a group because people might feel more accountable as the decision affects more people.
Accountability. We expect the level of accountability held against the decision-maker to
have an effect on surrogate decisions, thereby making them more cautious and potentially
reducing the risk that surrogates are willing to take. Indeed, it has been found that doctors
make more conservative decisions for their patients than themselves due to fear of the legal
consequences [28]. However, due to the low number of available studies that manipulated
accountability, we did not use accountability as a moderator. We will instead draw tentative
conclusions about its effect through an analysis of previous studies in our discussion.
Methodological moderators
Decision outcome. In the financial domain, studies use either real decisions (perfor-
mance-contingent payoffs) or hypothetical decisions (where the choices made in the experi-
ment have no bearing on participant payment), which is why it is important to understand
whether they are comparable. Data on whether the use of real or hypothetical rewards influ-
ences risk-taking is equivocal, with some studies reporting no difference [46,47], others report-
ing reduced risk-taking [48] or increased risk-taking [49] with real rewards. However, this has
not been studied with respect to surrogate decision-making and the question remains open.
Real decisions are likely to elicit stronger emotional involvement in the decision process than
hypothetical decisions, or at least should better reflect a genuinely experienced emotion. Given
that we assume self-other differences in risk preferences to be partly due to reduced emotional
involvement when making a surrogate decision, we expect self-other differences to be larger
when the outcomes are real rather than hypothetical. In terms of psychological distance, we
know that there is greater distance between ‘near and far’ than ‘far and further’ [50]. If we con-
sider hypothetical and surrogate decisions to be psychological distant decisions, surrogate
decisions should be construed as more distant in real decisions than hypothetical decisions.
We would therefore expect to find greater self-other differences in real than hypothetical
decisions.
Design. We added the design used to measure self-other differences–whether the effect of
recipient was elicited between-subjects or within-subjects–to investigate whether it moderates
the strength of self-other differences. Within-subject designs might encourage participants to
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compare their decisions between recipients which could lead to experimenter demand effects
whereby participants become aware of the experimental manipulation and change their behav-
iour, which could result in larger self-other differences (see [51] for a comparison of between-
and within-subject designs in behavioural economics). On the other hand, within-subject
designs could also lead to carry-over effects, in such a way that decisions in one condition
could contaminate the other and therefore lead to a uniformisation of responses across condi-
tions [52]. As mentioned by Charness et al. [51], carry-over effects do not tend to produce spe-
cific behavioural responses but are rather a function of the circumstances, whereas
experimenter demand effects have a tendency to magnify differences between conditions.
Given that demand effects make clearer predictions than carry-over effects, we expect within-
subject designs to lead to stronger self-other differences than between-subject designs.
Publication status. We hypothesise that published studies will show larger self-other dif-
ferences than unpublished studies as published studies are generally biased towards statistically
significant results and present larger effect sizes as has been found in reviews comparing results
from published and unpublished studies within meta-analyses [53,54].
Method
Search strategies
Various electronic databases were searched (Web of Science, PsycINFO, PubMed, Scopus,
EconPapers, Science Direct, Social Science Research Network, Google Scholar, Google) to
identify studies in March 2017 (we have also added relevant studies that have been published
since). We used the following search terms: ‘risk’, ‘loss aversion’ or ‘uncertainty’; ‘self and
other’, ‘self-other’, ‘other’, ‘surrogate’, ‘social distance’, or ‘psychological distance’; ‘choice’,
‘decision’ or ‘preference’. Studies that were cited by those that had been identified and studies
that cited them were searched (backward and forward searching). Included studies compared
choices (not ratings or advice) that an individual participant made for themselves to choices
they made on behalf of another person or a group. Both published and unpublished studies
(working papers, dissertations, doctoral theses, conference proceedings, unpublished data)
were included. Unpublished studies were identified through the same search methods as pub-
lished studies and we included some of our own unpublished data. Articles that were not writ-
ten in English, French or Spanish were excluded.
After screening records by title, abstracts of potentially relevant articles were examined
(N = 145). Duplicates were removed (N = 59). The full text of the remaining articles was
assessed for eligibility according to our criteria (N = 86) and articles that did not meet them
were eliminated (N = 43). We ended up with 43 articles consisting of 49 studies, to which we
added 6 unpublished studies (N = 55). We contacted authors of articles which did not include
sufficient information to compute effect sizes and excluded 8 studies from 6 articles from
authors who did not provide us with this information. We therefore included 49 studies with a
total of 7576 participants and 72 effect sizes (see S1 for a list of studies and S1 for details of
studies). Fig 1 contains details concerning the numbers of records identified through each
screening phase, adapted from the PRISMA statement [55].
Coding procedures
The first and third author read the papers independently and coded each study according to
the coding frame developed by the first author. The percent agreement between both authors
was high (89%). Disagreements were resolved through discussions between the first and third
author. See S3 for details regarding the coding criteria used. Numbers associated to k refer to
effect sizes.
Self-other differences in risk-taking
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Decision domain. We coded the domain in which participants were asked to make deci-
sions: Financial domain (k = 54), Interpersonal domain (k = 9) or Medical domain (k = 15).
We excluded studies in the interpersonal or medical domain that converted the outcomes of
the choices that participants made to a monetary value which participants received as payment,
as we believe this might have incentivised participants to think about their decisions as finan-
cial rather than medical/interpersonal, which makes the decision domain ambiguous.
Frame. Studies were coded according to whether decisions were made in a gain frame
(k = 30), in a loss frame (k = 12), in a gain frame which included the possibility of a loss
(k = 29) or in a loss frame which included the possibility of a gain (k = 7). In the financial
domain, choices in a gain frame involved winning money, choices in a loss frame involved los-
ing money, and choices which could either result in a loss or a win (investment tasks for exam-
ple) were considered made in a gain frame with the possibility of a loss. In the medical
domain, choices that involved taking a treatment to recover from an illness were coded as a
loss with the possibility of a gain, as a gain could arise if the treatment works. Choices that
involved a health improvement or vaccinations were coded as a gain or as a gain with the pos-
sibility of a loss, depending on whether doing so could worsen one’s health. In the interper-
sonal domain, choices which involved starting new relationships or moving relationships
forward were coded as a gain with the possibility of a loss given the possible negative conse-
quences of making such decisions (no studies included situations which could be coded as a
loss).
Recipient. We coded whether the recipient of the surrogate decision was either a stranger
or unidentified other (k = 39), a known/close other (friend, family member. . .) (k = 34), or a
group of people (2 or more) (k = 5).
Decision outcome. We coded whether the outcome of the decision was hypothetical
(k = 41) or real (k = 37). Real outcomes were studies where the recipient of the decision was
affected by the decisions made (both the decision makers when making choices for themselves
and the recipient when decision makers made surrogate choices). Studies which involved real
outcomes when participants made decisions for themselves but hypothetical rewards when
they made decisions for others were excluded.
Design. Studies were coded according to whether self-other differences were elicited
using a between-subjects design (k = 34) or a within-subjects design (k = 44). In a between-
subjects design, one group of participants made decisions for themselves, which was compared
Fig 1. Flow of information through the different phases of the meta-analysis screening process, adapted from
[55].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0216566.g001
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to another group of participants which made surrogate decisions. In a within-subjects design,
the same group of participants made decisions for themselves as well as surrogate decisions.
Publication status. Studies were coded according to whether they were published studies
(k = 51) or unpublished studies (k = 27).
Computation of effect sizes
We used standardized mean differences (Cohen’s d) as the effect size metric. In a number of
studies, effect sizes were estimated based on several assumptions. In cases where the total num-
ber of participants was given but not the exact number per group, we divided the total number
by the number of groups to estimate the sample size. In cases where participants took part in
two similar conditions (two different medical scenarios for example), we computed the effect
size of both conditions together. When means and standard deviations were available, for
between-subjects designs we used Cohen’s ds and for within-subjects designs we used Cohen’s
dav [56]. For studies that only reported t values, for between-subjects designs we used Cohen’s
ds from t [57], and for within-subjects designs we used Cohen’s dz [57]. For studies that only
reported F values, we used Cohen’s ds from F [58]. For studies that only reported η2, we trans-
formed η2 to d [59]. For studies that reported the proportion of participants making a particu-
lar choice, we calculated the odds ratio which we converted to Cohen’s d [60]. We changed the
sign of effect sizes where appropriate so that positive effect sizes represented choices for others
that are more risk-taking than choices for the self and vice versa. We then transformed all
effect sizes to Hedge’s g which corrects for biases in small samples and is recommended for use
in meta-analyses [56].
Analysis procedures
All analyses were performed in R using the metaphor package [61]. We used the random-effect
model to compute the overall effect size of self-other differences rather than a fixed-effect
model as the design and measures of included studies varied significantly. I2 and Q were used
as measures of heterogeneity. We report the 95% confidence intervals of each effect size. The
issue of publication bias was addressed via examining the funnel plot in which all effect sizes
are plotted against the standard error. To evaluate the severity of potential publication bias we
examined the effect size estimates following Duval and Tweedie’s [62] Trim-and-Fill method
and Egger’s regression intercept [63]. We used mixed-effect models for the moderator analy-
ses. To include a particular moderator or a sub-category of a moderator in an analysis, there
had to be at least 3 effect sizes from independent studies in that category. Given that we expect
to find self-other differences in different directions according to the decision domain, we con-
ducted separate main and moderator analyses on each domain as well as an overall analysis.
For studies that included multiple effect sizes that were not independent (different conditions
in a within-subjects design for example), they only contributed one summary effect size for the
main analysis. Summary effect sizes for these studies were computed using Cooper’s ‘shifting-
unit-of-analysis’ method [64]. We did not use this method in moderator analyses as studies
included multiple effect sizes because these related to different moderators; it did not make
sense to compute a summary effect size in such cases.
Results
Analysis of all studies
Across all the studies there were no self-other differences in risk-taking (k = 49, g = 0.009, CI
(-0.092, 0.109), p = .864). The analysis revealed that effect sizes were roughly symmetrical
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(Tau-squared = 0) and an absence of heterogeneity (I2 = 0, Q = 42.281, p = .705). We assessed
the extent of publication bias by firstly examining the adjusted effect size estimates according
to the Trim-and-Fill procedure with a random effects model. No studies were found missing
above the average effect size estimate, but ten studies were found missing below the average
effect size. When ten studies with an imputed effect size lower than the mean effect estimate
were filled in, the effect size estimate was in the other direction (k = 59, g = -0.089, CI (-0.194,
0.158), p = .096). However, Egger’s regression test for funnel plot asymmetry revealed a non-
significant regression coefficient (intercept = -0.13, SE = 0.12, p = .258). Taken together, both
indicators suggest that publication bias has probably not affected the present analysis. See Fig 2
for the funnel plot.
Moderator analyses. The analysis revealed that the decision domain significantly moder-
ated self-other differences in risk-taking (Q = 26.732, p< .001). There were no self-other dif-
ferences in the financial domain (k = 54, g = 0.010, I (-0.099, 0.120), p = .852). However, there
were significant differences in the interpersonal domain (k = 9, g = 0.554, CI (0.285, 0.823),
p< .001) and in the medical domain (k = 15, g = -0.267, CI (-0.430, -0.105), p = .001), meaning
that surrogate decisions were more risk-taking in the relationship domain but less risk-taking
in the medical domain. The frame of the decision was also a significant moderator (Q =
13.531, p = .009). There were no self-other differences in the gain frame (k = 30, g = 0.063, CI
(-0.078, 0.204), p = .379) and no self-other differences in the gain frame which included the
possibility of a loss (k = 29, g = 0.101, CI (-0.040, 0.242), p = .159). There were differences in
the loss frame (k = 12, g = -0.264, CI (-0.507, -0.022), p = .033) and in the loss frame which
included the possibility of a loss (k = 7, g = -0.300, CI (-0.535, -0.064), p = .013) where decisions
were less risk-taking for others than for the self. The remaining variables (recipient, outcome,
design, publication status) were not significant moderators. A statistical breakdown of these
results can be found in S4.
Meta-regression. We conducted a meta-regression with all the above moderators
(domain, frame, recipient, outcome, design, publication) which was significant (k = 78,
Q = 36.199, p< .001). Full results can be found in Table 1. The difference between the inter-
personal and the financial domain was significant (B = 0.525, p = .014). The difference between
the medical and the financial domain was marginally significant (B = -0.355, p = .057). The dif-
ference between the gain and loss frame was significant (B = -0.441, p = .004).
Fig 2. Funnel plot showing the effect sizes of all studies against their standard error. Effect sizes higher than 0
indicate that participants took more risk for someone else than for themselves. Effect sizes lower than 0 indicate that
participants took less risk for someone else than for themselves.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0216566.g002
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Interpersonal domain
Across all studies in the interpersonal domain there were significant self-other differences in
risk-taking (k = 8, g = 0.571, CI (0.296, 0.847), p< .001), indicating that people take more risk
for another person than for themselves. The analysis revealed that there was an absence of vari-
ation in the distribution of effect sizes (Tau-squared = 0) as well as an absence of heterogeneity
(I2 = 0, Q = 3.838, p = .798). We assessed the extent of publication bias by firstly examining the
adjusted effect size estimates according to the Trim-and-Fill procedure with a random effects
model. No studies were found missing below the average effect size estimate but two studies
were deemed missing above the average effect size estimate. When two studies with an
imputed effect size greater than the mean effect estimate were filled in, the effect size estimate
was slightly higher (k = 10, g = 0.657, CI (0.409, 0.906), p< .001). This suggests that the analy-
sis may be biased towards understating the summary effect size. This was confirmed by using
Egger’s regression test for funnel plot asymmetry which revealed a significant regression coef-
ficient (intercept = 1.46, SE = 0.37, p = .008). Both indicators suggest that publication bias has
affected the analysis by weakening the effect. We were unable to conduct moderator analyses
on decisions from the interpersonal domain due to a low number of effect sizes.
Medical domain
Across all studies in the medical domain there were significant self-other differences in risk-
taking (k = 11, g = -0.297, CI (-0.481, -0.112), p = .002), indicating that people take less risk
for others than for themselves. The analysis revealed that there was an absence of variation
in the distribution of effect sizes (Tau-squared = 0) as well as an absence of heterogeneity (I2 =
0, Q = 7.231, p = .703). We assessed the extent of publication bias by firstly examining the
adjusted effect size estimates according to Duval and Tweedie’s (2000) Trim-and-Fill proce-
dure with a random effects model. No studies were found missing below the average effect size
estimate, but four studies were found missing above the average effect size estimate. When
four studies with an imputed effect size higher than the mean effect estimate were filled in, the
effect size estimate was slightly lower (k = 15, g = -0.194, CI (-0.363, -0.026), p = .026). How-
ever, Egger’s regression test for funnel plot asymmetry did not reveal a significant regression
coefficient (intercept = -0.02, SE = 0.12, p = .897). Therefore, we can conclude that the present
analysis is probably not contaminated by publication bias.
Table 1. Meta-regression on analysis of all studies�.
B SE 95% CI P
Intercept 0.213 0.131 -0.044, 0.470 .105
Relationship (1) vs Financial (0) 0.525 0.214 0.106, 0.944 .014
Medical (1) vs Financial (0) -0.355 0.186 -0.720, 0.010 .057
Loss (1) vs Gain (0) -0.441 0.154 -0.743, -0.139 .004
Gain with Loss (1) vs Gain (0) -0.161 0.118 -0.392, 0.071 .174
Loss with Gain (1) vs Gain (0) -0.132 0.179 -0.482, 0.218 .459
Close (1) vs Stranger (0) -0.064 0.116 -0.291, 0.162 .578
Group (1) vs Stranger (0) -0.151 0.200 -0.543, 0.241 .450
Hypothetical (1) vs Real (0) 0.037 0.146 -0.250, 0.325 .798
Within (1) vs Between (0) -0.031 0.100 -0.226, 0.165 .759
Unpublished (1) vs Published (0) -0.030 0.107 -0.240, 0.180 .782
�Note: model is significant (p < .001)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0216566.t001
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We found that the frame of the decision was a significant moderator (Q = 8.391, p = .015).
Self-other differences in a gain frame were not significant (k = 6, g = -0.203, CI (-0.474, 0.068),
p = .141), but they were in a loss frame with the possibility of a gain (k = 7, g = -0.300, CI
(-0.535, -0.064), p = .013) where risk-taking was higher for self than other. There were no deci-
sions made in a loss frame and not enough made in a gain frame with the possibility of a loss
to include it in the analysis. The recipient of the surrogate decision was a significant moderator
(Q = 10.470, p = .005). Self-other differences when decisions were made on behalf of a stranger
were not significant (k = 4, g = -0.319, CI (-0.776, 0.138), p = .171), but they were significant
when decisions were made on behalf of a close other (k = 11, g = -0.260, CI (-0.434, -0.086), p
= .003). There were self-other differences when decisions were made on behalf of a close other
meaning that decisions were less risk-seeking for a close other than for a stranger (there were
no studies where decisions were made on behalf of a group). Finally, the design was a signifi-
cant moderator (Q = 10.657, p = .005), whereby self-other differences were larger in a within-
subjects design (k = 10, g = -0.310, CI (-0.543, -0.076), p = .009) than a between-subjects design
(k = 5, g = -0.228, CI (-0.454, -0.001), p = .049). We could not perform moderator analyses on
outcome and publication status due to a low number of effect sizes. Given this, we did not per-
form a meta-regression either.
Financial domain
Across all studies in the financial domain there were no significant self-other differences in
risk-taking (k = 31, g = 0.036, CI (-0.095, 0.167), p = .594). The analysis revealed that there was
an absence of variation in the distribution of effect sizes (Tau-squared = 0) as well as an
absence of heterogeneity (I2 = 0, Q = 11.433, p = .999). We assessed the extent of publication
bias by firstly examining the adjusted effect size estimates according to the Trim-and-Fill pro-
cedure with a random effects model. No studies were found missing above the average effect
size, but four studies were found missing below. When four studies with an imputed effect size
greater than the mean effect estimate were filled in, the effect size estimate was slightly lower (k
= 35, g = -0.011, CI (-0.136, 0.115), p = .866). However, Egger’s regression test for funnel plot
asymmetry did not reveal a significant regression coefficient (intercept = -0.20, SE = 0.11, p =
.088). Therefore, we can conclude that the present analysis was probably not contaminated by
publication bias.
The frame of the decision was a significant moderator (Q = 8.323, p = .040). Self-other dif-
ferences in the gain frame were marginally significant (k = 24, g = 0.163, CI (-0.003, 0.328), p =
.054) where people took slightly more risk for others than for themselves. There were self-
other differences in the loss frame (k = 12, g = -0.264, CI (-0.507, -0.022), p = .033) where peo-
ple took less risk for others than for themselves. However, there were no self-other differences
in the gain frame when the choice included the possibility of a loss (k = 18, g = -0.020, CI
(-0.202, 0.162), p = .831). The remaining variables (recipient, outcome, design, publication sta-
tus) were not significant moderators. A statistical breakdown can be found in S4.
Finally, we conducted a meta-regression with all the above moderators (domain, frame,
recipient, outcome, design, publication status) which approached significance (k = 54,
Q = 10.179, p = .179). Results can be found in Table 2, in which it can be seen that, even though
the model is not significant, there is a difference between decisions made in a gain frame as
opposed to those made in a loss frame (B = -0.452, p = .004).
Discussion
We did not find an overall self-other difference. However, we show that distinct patterns of
self-other differences emerge when we consider a series of theoretical moderators. Crucially,
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we found that there are differences between decision domains and decision frames, even when
other moderators are accounted for. This suggests that self-other differences are not easily
comparable and sheds light on the inconsistencies in findings that have arisen so far. In the
sections below, we discuss these moderator effects.
Domain
Self-other decisions were moderated by decision domain (medical, financial or interpersonal).
In the medical domain, decision-makers are more risk-taking for themselves than for another
person (small effect), whereas in the interpersonal domain they are more risk-taking for some-
one else than for themselves (medium effect). In the financial domain, there seems to be an
overall absence of self-other differences. This finding is concurrent with the previous meta-
analysis [15] which showed that decisions were more risk-averse for others in a medical con-
text but that there were no self-other differences in other contexts (financial and interpersonal
decisions were analysed together). This is crucial to our understanding of surrogate decision-
making as it shows that decisions are not necessarily comparable across domains, meaning
that there are features of each domain which require further investigation to understand why
divergent patterns of self-other differences arise.
A key difference between the interpersonal and medical domains and the financial domain
is the significance of the decision, which could explain the difference in effect size between
domains. Although financial decisions can be just as important and consequential as interper-
sonal or medical decisions, the amounts of money that are used in all included studies but one
(study 3 in [9] are small (two or three digit amounts). In fact, studies that use real rewards
(about two thirds of financial studies) convert outcomes of choices to payments (which tend to
be a single digit amount), meaning that participants are actually making decisions that involve
very small amounts of money. All financial studies used relatively inconsequential decisions,
whereas interpersonal studies could include life-changing decisions and medical studies often
did. The present meta-analysis can draw conclusions only about financial decisions which
have a small outcome. It may be that self-other differences are altered when large outcomes are
studied. On the other hand, a significant proportion of studies in the financial domain used
real decisions, thereby increasing their ecological validity. In the medical and interpersonal
domain, where decisions were hypothetical, it could be that participants were motivated by
self-image concerns, conforming to social norms in an experimental setting, but might not do
so in real scenarios. However, we did not find any differences between real and hypothetical
outcomes in financial decisions.
Table 2. Meta-regression on analysis of financial domain�.
B SE 95% CI p
Intercept 0.276 0.137 -0.035, 0.503 .089
Loss (1) vs Gain (0) -0.452 0.157 -0.760, -0.144 .004
Gain with Loss (1) vs Gain (0) -0.176 0.133 -0.437, 0.086 .188
Close (1) vs Stranger (0) -0.152 0.136 -0.419, 0.115 .264
Group (1) vs Stranger (0) -0.165 0.201 -0.559, 0.228 .410
Hypothetical (1) vs Real (0) 0.075 0.150 -0.219, 0.369 .618
Within (1) vs Between (0) -0.012 0.122 -0.250, 0.236 .920
Unpublished (1) vs Published (0) -0.047 0.117 -0.276, 0.183 .689
�Note: model is not significant (p = .179)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0216566.t002
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Following from Social Values Theory [23], it could be the case that risk-aversion is valued
in the medical domain whereas risk-taking is valued in the interpersonal domain. It is plausible
to assume that taking a medical decision that could lead to a negative outcome, or the absence
of an outcome, would be seen as a bad decision. A high degree of responsibility and account-
ability could be then held against the decision-maker, particularly in public health scenarios or
decisions that could lead to the death of a patient. In terms of relationships however, taking a
certain level of risk is perhaps necessary to developing a relationship. It remains unclear which
social values could prevail in financial decisions, particularly those with little consequences.
Nonetheless, taking high risks could be considered impulsive and irrational, and therefore not
socially valued, especially when it comes to decisions which involve large amounts of money.
However, in the case of the financial decisions made leading up to the financial crisis, deci-
sion-makers were in fact accused of excessive risk-taking [8], which makes the study of surro-
gate financial decisions with large outcomes all the more relevant and necessary.
Frame
We also found that the frame of the decision was a significant moderator, but did not necessar-
ily manifest itself in the same way across domains. Overall, people were less risk-taking for
someone else than for themselves in a loss frame and in a loss frame which includes the possi-
bility of a gain. There were no differences when decisions were in a gain frame or in a gain
frame which included the possibility of a loss. This is consistent with the previous meta-analy-
sis [15] which found self-other differences for losses but not gains. Given that we know that
people are more impacted by losses than gains [43], it is plausible that this effect would also
translate to a surrogate context, where accountability might be higher for losses than gains. In
the financial domain, self-other differences were divergent depending on the frame in which
they were elicited and followed the predictions we made given the risk-as-feelings hypothesis
(i.e. risk preferences were attenuated in a surrogate context). This helps to elucidate contradic-
tory findings in the financial domain. In the medical domain, although risk-taking was
reduced for others, self-other differences were significant in a loss frame but not in a gain
frame. We were unable to investigate the effect of frame in the interpersonal domain due to a
lack of studies made in a loss frame. In fact, all studies from the interpersonal domain used or
adapted the scenarios devised by Beisswanger et al. [25], which could be why the most consis-
tent and strongest self-other difference is found within this domain. There is therefore a need
for studies using different scenarios to study the interpersonal domain.
Recipient
We did not find that the identity of the recipient of the surrogate decision moderated the over-
all effect, although this could be because there was no overall self-other difference. In the medi-
cal domain, the recipient was a significant moderator of the self-other difference: people take
less risk when decisions were made on behalf of a close other than on behalf of a stranger. This
could be because they are more concerned about taking a risk which leads to a negative out-
come when the recipient is someone close to them as opposed to someone they do not know.
It could also be that accountability has a larger effect on decisions for a close other than for a
stranger, if decisions made for a stranger give more anonymity to the decision-maker for
example. In the interpersonal domain, we were unable to look at the effect of recipient. In the
financial domain, although the identity of the surrogate recipient was not a significant modera-
tor, the effect sizes indicate a trend whereby decisions made on behalf of a stranger may be
more risk-taking than one’s own decisions, whereas decisions made for a close other or a
group of people may be less risk-taking. We therefore find some evidence for an effect of
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psychological distance, but evidence is weak and further research is needed. Interestingly, a
study found that surrogates believe they would reduce their financial risk-taking for others rel-
ative to themselves [65], which is in line with the behavioural trend we find here for close oth-
ers but not distant others. This indicates that there might be a discrepancy between what
surrogates believe they would do and what they actually do. There is also evidence from the
wider literature that psychological distance has an effect on surrogate decisions. For example,
smaller psychological distance increases surrogates’ emotional burden, making them more
likely to minimise the risk of regret when making decisions [66].
Accountability
We could not quantitatively assess the effect of accountability given the low number of studies
that we were able to include. The results of these studies are nonetheless interesting. Eriksen
and Kvaloy [37] found that people take less risk for someone else than for themselves in an
investment task where the recipient was given feedback on choices made by the decision-
maker. Pollmann et al. [19] found that people take less risk for others when accountability is
manipulated in an investment task than when it is not. Losecaat Vermeer [67] found that in a
gain frame, people took more risk for someone else but more so in a low than a high responsi-
bility condition. Moreover, in terms of decision made on behalf of a group of people, whereby
the decision is affecting more people and therefore has larger consequences, we hypothesise
that this would increase the effect of accountability and social values on the decision process
and perhaps also reduce risk-taking, which is in line with the trend evidence reported here.
This is in line with the previous meta-analysis which suggests that surrogate decisions might
be drawn to risk-aversion due to the avoidance of anticipated blame [15]. More studies are
needed to investigate the effect of accountability on risk-taking in the financial literature, and
it would be particularly interesting to assess its impact on decisions with large outcomes–per-
haps holding decision makers accountable for their decisions can reduce irresponsible or high
risk-taking. For similar reasons, assessing its impact on other decision domains would be ben-
eficial, such as studying the consequences that the fear of being held accountable or legally pur-
sued can have on doctors’ decision-making.
Methodological moderators
We did not find that the nature of the outcome impacted self-other differences. This is particu-
larly relevant to the financial domain where there is an ongoing debate about the validity of
experiments that do not use performance-contingent payments [68]. Although risk-taking
might differ between real and hypothetical rewards, this does not seem to affect the conclu-
sions that can be drawn about self-other differences. However, we were not able to include real
medical or interpersonal decisions. We did not find differences overall between studies that
used a between-subject design to test self-other differences and those that used a within-sub-
jects design. On the other hand, self-other differences in the medical domain were stronger in
within-subject designs than in between-subject designs, which indicates some evidence for
experimenter demand effects. We did not find differences either between published and
unpublished studies, which is reassuring with respect to potential publication bias. However,
this could be partly attributable to the fact that a lot of studies were working papers from the
economics literature which are of a similar standard to published papers.
Future directions
The present meta-analysis has identified several gaps in the literature. For a start, there are
considerably more studies that have investigated financial decisions than interpersonal and
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medical decisions. We could also not perform several of our moderator analyses due to a low
number of effect sizes. Further work is needed to identify how the identity of the surrogate
recipient affects decisions in both the interpersonal and the financial domains. To be able to
adequately compare self-other differences across domains, decisions in the financial domain
that have higher levels of significance require investigation. One of the setbacks to studying
larger outcomes is that using real payoffs that match amounts used in the experimental task is
unlikely to be possible. However, we did not find a difference here between studies using real
and hypothetical outcomes, indicating that perhaps using hypothetical outcomes may be an
adequate proxy for real decisions. Nevertheless, real-world decisions are often a lot more com-
plex than the scenarios set up in these studies, which is why it is so important to study how a
variety of features of a decision impact surrogate risk-taking. There is indeed a need for look-
ing at surrogate decisions in real world settings, particularly for medical and interpersonal
domains where experimental studies have so far been restricted to hypothetical scenarios.
Investigating the role of accountability and social values will be a particularly important step to
understanding real-world decision-making.
Finally, in this review, we have been quite liberal about our definition of risk and the studies
we incorporated as a result in our meta-analysis. We chose to keep the definition broad in
order to bring together different literatures and theories on risk-taking in surrogate decision-
making. These can be quite distinct in the scenarios they present. For example, experiments in
the economic literature uses probabilistic outcomes whereas those in the interpersonal did not
and conceptualised risk as the uncertainty contained in the actions of others. For that reason,
we analysed these literatures together in our overall analysis, but also separately by decision
domain. Nevertheless, the differences between the scenarios in each domain leads one to won-
der whether they are measuring the same thing when it comes to risk. Future work should aim
to create scenarios which are more easily comparable across domains, controlling for factors
such as the presence or absence of clear probabilistic outcomes. There is indeed evidence of a
distinction between our attitudes towards a purely probabilistic risk (where risk is not contin-
gent on others’ behaviour) and a social risk (where risk is contingent on others’ behaviour)
[69], which is reflected in the finding that individual risk attitudes vary between domains [41].
Future work should aim to tease apart both types of risk in the context of surrogate decisions
in order to better understand the domain differences we highlight here.
Conclusion
Our meta-analysis indicates that the differences between risky decisions that people make for
themselves and those they make for others vary according to the domain and the frame of the
decision. We believe that the present meta-analysis has contributed to the debate in the litera-
ture and offered potential avenues of research to be pursued to enhance our understanding of
risk preferences in surrogate decision making.
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